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Abstract
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to adversarial
attack despite their tremendous success in many artificial in-
telligence fields. Adversarial attack is a method that causes
the intended misclassfication by adding imperceptible pertur-
bations to legitimate inputs. To date, researchers have devel-
oped numerous types of adversarial attack methods. How-
ever, from the perspective of practical deployment, these
methods suffer from several drawbacks such as long attack
generating time, high memory cost, insufficient robustness
and low transferability. To address the drawbacks, we pro-
pose a Content-aware Adversarial Attack Generator (CAG)
to achieve real-time, low-cost, enhanced-robustness and high-
transferability adversarial attack. First, as a type of generative
model-based attack, CAG shows significant speedup (at least
500 times) in generating adversarial examples compared to
the state-of-the-art attacks such as PGD and C&W. Further-
more, CAG only needs a single generative model to perform
targeted attack to any targeted class. Because CAG encodes
the label information into a trainable embedding layer, it dif-
fers from prior generative model-based adversarial attacks
that use n different copies of generative models for n different
targeted classes. As a result, CAG significantly reduces the
required memory cost for generating adversarial examples.
Moreover, CAG can generate adversarial perturbations that
focus on the critical areas of input by integrating the class ac-
tivation maps information in the training process, and hence
improve the robustness of CAG attack against the state-of-art
adversarial defenses. In addition, CAG exhibits high transfer-
ability across different DNN classifier models in black-box
attack scenario by introducing random dropout in the pro-
cess of generating perturbations. Extensive experiments on
different datasets and DNN models have verified the real-
time, low-cost, enhanced-robustness, and high-transferability
benefits of CAG.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved unprece-
dented success in many artificial intelligence fields, such
as computer vision, natural language processing and speech
recognition (He et al. 2016; Conneau et al. 2016; Yu and
Deng 2014). Despite their current popularity and prosperity,
DNNs are still facing several severe challenges, especially
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their high vulnerability to adversarial attack (Goodfellow,
Shlens, and Szegedy 2014; Carlini and Wagner 2017), which
adds well-designed tiny perturbations to the legitimate in-
puts to cause the intended misclassification of DNN mod-
els. Such attacks could cause severe safety, economic and
social problems if launched to the DNNs deployed in practi-
cal applications ranging from face recognition, autonomous
driving to speech authentication.
Figure 1: Adversarial images generated with CAG using Im-
ageNet dataset. From top row to bottom row: legitimate im-
ages, adversarial images, perturbations (enhanced).
In order to address this critical challenge, the machine
learning community has conducted extensive researches on
the vulnerability of DNNs, from both the attack and de-
fense aspects. Adversarial attack technique was pioneered
by Szegedy et al. (2013). Since then, researchers have de-
veloped various adversarial attacking algorithms, targeting
different types of DNN models including convolutional neu-
ral networks, recurrent neural networks and graph neural
networks, and also different application scenarios, rang-
ing from image classification, machine translation, to graph
classification etc. Among those algorithms, one popular
class of attack techniques is fast gradient sign method
(FGSM), which performs one-step gradient computation to
craft untargeted adversarial examples (Goodfellow, Shlens,
and Szegedy 2014). Considering the relatively weak attack
performance of FGSM, the machine learning community
has proposed several iterative optimization-based techniques
including C&W, I-FGSM and PGD that deliver the state-
of-the-art attack performance (Carlini and Wagner 2017;
Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014; Madry et al. 2017).
Furthermore, some recent work has also proposed to use
generative models, e.g., GAN and U-Net, to generate ad-
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versarial examples (Poursaeed et al. 2018; Xiao et al. 2018;
Goodfellow et al. 2014; Ronneberger, Fischer, and Brox
2015).
Although the existing adversarial attack methods can al-
ready exhibit high attack success rate (ASR), especially in
white-box attack scenario, from the perspective of practi-
cal deployment, they are still suffering one or more draw-
backs, namely long adversarial example generating time,
high memory cost for launching adversarial attack, insuf-
ficient robustness against defense methods and low transfer-
ability in black-box attack scenario.
Aiming to overcome these drawbacks, in this paper
we propose a Content-aware Adversarial Attack Generator
(CAG), to achieve real-time, low-cost, enhanced-robustness
and high-transferability adversarial attack. We show some
adversarial images generated by CAG in Figure 1. The fea-
tures and benefits of CAG are summarized as follows:
• CAG is a generative model-based attack, so it can avoid
time-consuming iterative optimization procedure to gen-
erate adversarial examples. Compared with the state-of-
the-art iterative attacks such as PGD and C&W, CAG
achieves significant speedup (at least 500 times), and
hence makes real-time attack possible.
• CAG utilizes a trainable embedding layer to encode all
label information to one single model, unlike prior gener-
ative model-based methods which require different gener-
ative models for different targeted classes. In n-class tar-
geted attack scenario, the number of the required gener-
ative models is reduced from n to 1, thereby drastically
reducing the memory cost for launching attacks.
• CAG integrates the class activation maps (CAMs) in-
formation into the training process, in contrast to many
other attack methods that generate adversarial perturba-
tions over the entire input. Consequently, CAG is able to
generate adversarial perturbations that focus on the criti-
cal areas of input, and thus improves the attack’s robust-
ness against the state-of-art defense approaches.
• CAG exhibits high transferability across different DNN
classifier models in black-box attack scenario. CAG can
generate adversarial perturbations with better general-
ity by introducing random dropout in the perturbations-
generation process. As a result, CAG’s adversarial ex-
amples have higher transferability when attacking unseen
classifiers.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces the related work on adversarial attack and de-
fense methods. Section 3 discusses our motivation. Section
4 describes the technical details of CAG. The experimental
results are presented and analyzed in Section 5. Section 6
draws the conclusions of all findings in our paper.
2 Related Work
2.1 Adversarial Attacks
To define an adversarial attack, let X = {x1, ..., xm} be a
set of the valid inputs from the dataset, y ∈ {1, ..., L} be
the valid class label, and F (·) be the well-trained DNN clas-
sifier. Let (xi, yi) denote the i-th benign instance and the
corresponding true label. The goal of an adversarial attack is
to create the x′i = xi+ δ, where δ is imperceptible adversar-
ial perturbation. A nontargeted attack requires F (xi) 6= yi
and a targeted attack specifies t 6= i such that F (x′i) = yt.
FGSM Fast gradient sign method (FGSM) is a one-step
fast-adversarial-example-generation approach (Goodfellow,
Shlens, and Szegedy 2014). It aims to linearize loss func-
tion in L∞ neighborhood of a legitimate input and to find
the exact maximum of the linearized loss function. Corre-
spondingly, its adversarial example generation formula is as
follows:
x′ = x+  · sign(∆J(x, ytrue)),
where ytrue denotes the true label, ∆J(., .) computes the
gradient of the loss function, and sign denotes the sign func-
tion. Notice that here  is the attack strength parameter to
control the balance between the attack performance and the
norm of the perturbations.
I-FGSM & PGD Although FGSM is fast, its attack per-
formance is relatively weak. Researchers have proposed var-
ious approaches to achieve stronger attack by improving
the vanilla FGSM method. Kurakin et al. (2016) propose to
take multiple steps of FGSM (I-FGSM) with smaller attack
strength α in an iterative way:
x′N+1 = Clip{x′N + α · sign(∆J(x′N , ytrue)},
where x′N is the adversarial image at the N -th iteration, and
Clip{·} clips the overall attack strength back to  at the end
of the iteration. Notice that in the case of using L∞ norm,
I-FGSM is equivalent to another popular iteration-based at-
tack method (PGD) (Madry et al. 2017).
C&W C&W (Carlini and Wagner 2017) is an
optimization-based attack method. It aims to optimize
the loss function as follows:
‖x′ − x‖p + c ·max(max
i 6=t
f(x′)i − f(x′)t,−κ),
where t is the targeted class, f(·) denotes the softmax func-
tion, c is a constant set by binary search, and κ is an ad-
justable parameter that encourages the attacker to find an
adversarial example being classified as class twith high con-
fidence. By minimizing the above loss function using Adam
optimizer in an iterative way, C&W can achieve high ASR
with low perturbation norm.
Generative Model-based One drawback of the iterative
methods mentioned above is long generating time. Hence
another method to generate adversarial examples is to use a
generative model, such as GAN, Autoencoder (Goodfellow
et al. 2014) or U-Net. For instance, Xiao et al. (2018) ap-
ply AdvGAN to craft perceptually realistic adversarial ex-
amples. Moreover, Baluja et al. (2017) develop an adversar-
ial transformation network to convert inputs into adversarial
examples. Poursaeed et al. (2018) propose a method they
name Generative Adversarial Perturbations (GAP) that uses
a ResNet-based generative model (Johnson, Alahi, and Fei-
Fei 2016) to perform adversarial attack.
2.2 Adversarial Defenses
Pixel Deflection The key idea of pixel deflection defense
is to randomly replace pixels with nearby pixels (Prakash
et al. 2018). To achieve the replacement, this method uses
CAMs of the top-5 predictions to guide the update of the
pixels (Zhou et al. 2016). In this scenario, the probability of
a pixel being updated is inversely proportional to the like-
lihood that the area contains the object. After the pixel re-
placement, a denoising operation is applied to recover the
classification accuracy.
Randomization The mitigation of adversarial attack ef-
fects can also be achieved by using randomization. For in-
stance, Xie et al. proposes to first resize the input to random
size (2017). After that, a random padding operation is per-
formed to pad zeros around the resized image. Though it
may seem simple, this method can significantly improve the
robustness of DNN models against adversarial attack.
Input Transformation Another type of popular defense
methods is input transformation. Its key idea is to per-
form various transformations, such as bit-depth reduction,
lossy compression and variance minimization on adversar-
ial examples to mitigate the attack effects (Guo et al. 2017;
Xu, Evans, and Qi 2017). The reported experimental results
show that these methods can achieve balance between ro-
bustness against attack and computation overhead.
3 Motivations
Despite the abundance of researches on adversarial attack
methods described in Section 2, existing approaches still
suffer from several inherent drawbacks–in particular from
the perspective of practical deployment.
Long Generation Time Iteration-based approaches pre-
dominate among current state-of-the-art methods, including
PGD and C&W. Consequently, generating adversarial exam-
ples using iteration is time-expensive and requires extensive
computational resources, especially for the targeted attack.
For example, to achieve a high ASR, C&W method takes
hours to generate 100 large-size adversarial examples on a
GPU. Such long generation time makes launching the ad-
versarial attack in real-time setting infeasible.
High Memory Cost Using an iteration-free generative
model-based attack promises to avoid long generation time
(Xiao et al. 2018; Poursaeed et al. 2018; Baluja and Fis-
cher 2017). However, in these existing works if the attack-
ers wants to achieve targeted attack to a specific class, they
have to train different generator models for different targeted
classes. For example, to prepare for the targeted attack to
1000 classes in the ImageNet dataset, in total 1000 differ-
ent generator models have to be trained and stored, thereby
causing massive memory cost.
Insufficient Robustness To date, most adversarial exam-
ple generation is based on the search over the entire input
size instead of focusing on the critical part of legitimate ob-
ject content. Noticing this phenomenon, many defense meth-
ods have been developed to improve defense performance
via integrating this information into the defense scheme. For
instance, Luo et al. propose to mask out the background re-
gions with little transformation performed on the critical ar-
eas (Luo et al. 2015). Similarly, Prakash et al. propose to
use pixel deflection to denoise and reconstruct the input by
locally redistributing pixels under the guidance of the object
position (2018). Consequently, such well-designed defense
schemes make the existing adversarial attack exhibit insuffi-
cient robustness.
Low Transferability Most adversarial attack methods
can achieve high ASR in the white-box attack scenario.
However, in real-world applications, black-box attack is a
more common environment setting. In such cases, the trans-
ferability of the generated adversarial examples is important
to ensure a successful attack. However, to date on large-scale
datasets and large DNN models, the existing adversarial at-
tack approaches exhibit low transferability, thereby imped-
ing the feasibility of launching real-life black-box attack.
Our Motivation Motivated to redress the above chal-
lenges plaguing the existing adversarial attack methods, we
aim to develop an adversarial attack method that can 1) gen-
erate each adversarial example in a real-time manner; 2) re-
quire only one model for different targeted classes; 3) ex-
hibit strong robustness against the-state-of-the-art defense
techniques; and 4) exhibit high transferability in the black-
box attack scenario. To fulfill those requirements, we de-
velop CAG, an attack method with fast generation speed,
low memory cost, improved robustness and high transfer-
ability. Next, we describe the model training and attack gen-
eration schemes of CAG in detail.
4 CAG: Content-aware Adversarial Attack
Generator
4.1 Overall Architecture
Figure 2: Overall architecture of CAG.
Figure 2 illustrates the overall architecture of CAG. To
generate an adversarial image, an input tensor T is first con-
structed based on the given clean image x, true label i and
targeted label t. Then a generator model G(·), in the for-
mat of U-Net, is used to generate the perturbations δ from
T . After that, δ is scaled to a fixed L2 norm and added to
x. Finally, after clipping out-of-range values, the adversarial
image x′ is ready to mislead the classifier from original true
class i to the targeted class t.
Fast Generation Speed using U-Net CAG utilizes U-
Net as the underlying generative model. Therefore, when
compared with other iteration-based attack methods, U-Net-
based approach avoids time-expensive iterative procedure,
and hence makes real-time generation of adversarial exam-
ples possible.
4.2 Building Input Tensors
Figure 3: Building input tensor for CAG. The target class is
randomly selected and given in training and testing phase,
respectively.
Single Generative Model via Label Embedding As
mentioned in Section 3, the main drawback of generative
model-based attack is a need for massive amount of models
for different target classes. To address this problem, we en-
code the class label information into the input tensor T for
U-Net. Figure 3 shows the overall procedure of construct-
ing T . Here the dimension of the clean image is denoted as
h × w × c where h,w, c represent height, width and num-
ber of channels, respectively. Then during training phase, an
embedding layer EhwL with the size of h×w×L, where L
is the number of valid classes, is trained to encode the label
information. Specifically, in the forward propagation pass, a
targeted class t is randomly selected for each training data
xi. The target label t, as well as the true label i, are used
to extract the corresponding slices Et and Ei from EhwL,
where Ek = E::k denotes the k-th front slice of the embed-
ding layer EhwL. Then in the backward propagation phase,
Et and Ei are updated to help EhwL capture more class in-
formation for this training data. After being trained on the
entire dataset, the embedding layer EhwL learns the impor-
tant class encoding information and thereby ensuring only
one U-Net model is sufficient for different target classes.
Enhanced Attack Robustness using CAM Besides us-
ing an embedding layer, the construction of input tensor T
also utilizes the information of CAMs. Classifiers make de-
cisions based heavily on the hot areas of CAM because they
contain the most discriminative information of an image.
Therefore, defense methods cannot make substantial mod-
ifications in these critical area, otherwise they can easily
cause misclassifications. Taking advantage of this behavior,
we place the perturbations only on the hot areas of CAM to
enhance the robustness of our attack against many defense
schemes. To achieve this increment in robustness, the posi-
tion of the object in the image needs to be integrated into the
input tensor, which can be reflected by the CAM. As shown
in Figure 3, another component of input tensor T is CAM ix
with the size of h × w × 1, which is the CAM with respect
to input xi and its true label yi. Consequently, we denote τ
as the concatenating operation, and the final input tensor is
constructed as follows:
T = τ(xi, Ei, Et, CAM
i
x),
where the size of T is h× w × (c+ 3).
4.3 Training CAG
Algorithm 1: CAG Training Algorithm
1 Input: dataset X = {x1, ..., xm}, true labels
y ∈ {1, ...L}, classifier F (·), input tensor T , desired
perturbation L2 norm.
2 Result: trained CAG G(·), embedding layer EhwL.
3 Random initialize G(·), EhwL.
4 for xi, yi in dataset do
5 yt = get random target(yi), t 6= i;
6 Ei = (E::i), Et = (E::t); h× w × 1;
7 CAM ix = cam generator(x, yi);
8 T = concat(xi, Ei, Et, CAM ix);
9 δ = drop out (G(T ));
10 δ = L2 norm adjust(δ);
11 adversarial img = x′i = clip(xi + δ) ;
12 ypred = F (x′i);
13 CAM tx′ = cam generator(x
′, yt);
14 Loss = CrossEntropy(yt, ypred) +
β·‖CAM ix − CAM tx′‖2;
15 update(G(·)); update(EhwL);
16 end
Next, we describe the details of CAG training procedure.
Our objective is to get G(·) and EhwL to achieve:
F (clip(G(T ) + xi)) = yt.
In this scenario, the embedding layer EhwL is treated as a
model parameter that can be learned, so that yt can be any
selected label from {1, ..., L}. Therefore, we can formulate
an effective loss function Loss, and use existing optimiza-
tion algorithms to perform training as follows.
First, in order to keep the perturbations imperceptible, we
scale the perturbations using the L2 distance metric. In other
words, we keep all the perturbations at a fixed L2 norm to
constrain the attack strength of the noise in a fixed amount.
Then we feed the generated adversarial example x′i to the
classifier F (x′i) to produce the prediction ypred. We define
Losstarget as the cross-entropy with respect to the one-hot
label of the targeted class. Therefore, to ensure the generated
adversarial examples can fool the classifier, Losstarget is
formulated as:
Losstarget = CrossEntropy(yt, ypred).
Meanwhile, the CAM of the targeted class t for x′ is com-
puted and denoted as CAM tx′ . We aim to concentrate the
adversarial noise on the critical areas which contain the le-
gitimate object content, so that the CAM tx′ for the adversar-
ial examples would not be significantly changed compared
to CAM ix. In other words, to satisfy the similarity between
CAM tx′ and CAM
i
x, we need to minimize the their L2 dis-
tance. Therefore, LossCAM is defined to lead the distribu-
tion of the noise:
LossCAM = ‖CAM ix − CAM tx′‖2.
Finally, the new loss function is formulated as:
Loss = Losstarget + β · LossCAM ,
where β controls the magnitude of LossCAM . We then it-
eratively optimize the CAG as well as EhwL by minimizing
the Loss function. The details of our approach to train the
CAG are summarized in Algorithm 1.
Improve Transferability via Noise Dropout It is worth
noting that before directly adding the noise on xi, we pro-
pose to apply a dropout layer with probability p in the train-
ing phase. As a result, dropout layer can eliminate over-
fitting problem to the current classifier and achieve better
performance in black-box attack scenario by increasing the
transferability. The extensive experimental results are given
in the next section.
Figure 4: Embeddings of different classes after using T-SNE
to reduce the dimension (CIFAR-10).
After preparing CAG and EhwL to perform attacks, we
visualize the EhwL to demonstrate the effectiveness of this
embedding layer. We show the examples using CIFAR-10
dataset, thus the size of the embedding layer is 32 × 32 ×
10 for 10 classes (Krizhevsky, Hinton, and others 2009).
For better visualization, T-SNE is applied to reduce the
each class embedding’s dimension to 2 (Maaten and Hinton
2008). As we can see from Figure 4, at epoch 0, class em-
beddings are initialized and distributed randomly. However,
at epoch 500, embeddings of similar classes are close to each
other, such as car-truck, horse-deer, and dog-cat. Therefore,
the local distance between similar classes suggests that our
approach creates a useful set of embeddings.
We also show the attention regions using CAM for ad-
versarial examples generated by different attack methods.
As shown in Figure 5, compared with the clean images, I-
FGSM and GAP achieve targeted attack by misleading the
network’s attention. However, we believe that changing the
attention would make adversarial images vulnerable to de-
signed defense mechanisms. Interestingly, as can be seen in
the last row of Figure 5, the adversarial images generated by
Figure 5: CAM attention visualization. From top row to bot-
tom row: clean images, CAM of clean images, CAM of
PGD’s adversarial images, CAM of GAP’s adversarial im-
ages, CAM of CAG’s adversarial images.
CAG do not suffer from this problem. Malicious perturba-
tions are constrained to locate in the discriminative areas, so
that CAG’s adversarial examples are robust enough circum-
vent detection and defense methods.
5 Experimental Results
5.1 Experiment Design
To evaluate the effectiveness of CAG, we conduct exten-
sive experiments on CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky, Hinton, and
others 2009) and ImageNet (Deng et al. 2009) dataset.
We perform white-box and black-box attacks by using a
pool of 6 different classifiers: ResNet-18 (RN-18), ResNet-
34 (RN-34); VGG-11, VGG-13; DenseNet-121 (DN-121),
DenseNet-169 (DN-169) (He et al. 2016; Simonyan and Zis-
serman 2014; Huang et al. 2017). The top-1 classification
accuracy is above 92% (CIFAR-10) and above 70% (Im-
ageNet) for all classifiers. We use ResNet-18 to generate
CAMs for all experiments. We set β = 3 for both datasets
because higher β enforces too much restriction and can re-
duce ASR. Then we train CAG using SGD with Nesterov
momentum. The initial learning rate is set to 5e−2 and grad-
ually decayed to 1e−6 using a cosine annealing curve. Dur-
ing training, a target label is randomly picked from all incor-
rect classes for each data point. On CIFAR-10, the CAG is
trained for a total of 500 epochs using the batch size of 256.
On ImagetNet, we train the CAG for 20 epochs with batch
size of 64. The L2 norm of adversarial perturbations is set to
0.1 for both datasets.
We compare our proposed method with other existing at-
tack algorithms: I-FGSM, PGD, and C&W. We use FoolBox
in PyTorch (Rauber, Brendel, and Bethge 2017) to generate
these adversarial examples. Our experiments are performed
on NVIDIA Tesla V100 GPU.
5.2 CIFAR-10
ASR Acc. L2 Time
I-FGSM 99.53% 0.05% 0.106 13m24s
PGD 99.56% 0.22% 0.106 12m56s
C&W 99.85% 0.14% 0.009 >10h
CAG 97.29% 1.4% 0.100 1.44s
Table 1: Comparison of adversarial examples generated by
CAG and other methods on ResNet-18 (CIFAR-10).
We first evaluate our proposed CAG on CIFAR-10 in
white-box scenario. The classifier is set to be ResNet-18, and
the classification accuracy on clean images achieves 93.48%
for 10,000 validation images. To evaluate the targeted attack
algorithms, ASR is used as the performance metric.
Low Computation Time We generate 10,000 adversar-
ial examples in CIFAR-10 validation set, and each image
is targeted to a randomly incorrect class. The ASR can reach
97.29% on the ResNet-18. We compare our proposed CAG
with other state-of-art targeted attack methods. Similar to
the procedure we use to evaluate CAG, we also choose at-
tack targets in random manner. As for C&W, we only report
first 1000 images targeted on random classes. Since the L2
norm for CAG is set to be 0.1, for fair comparison, we try to
keep L2 norm around similar range for I-FGSM and PGD.
Therefore,  and α is set to 0.1 and 0.035, respectively. The
maximum iteration is set to 50. When using C&W attack,
we perform 10 iterations of binary search and run 10,000 it-
erations of gradient descent with learning rate at 0.005 using
the Adam optimizer. We only generate 1,000 images using
C&W attack. As can be seen from the Table 1, our attack
achieves comparable results compared with I-FGSM, PGD,
and C&W. However, our attack has much lower inference
time of only 1.44 seconds compared of 12 minutes 56 sec-
onds of PGD and more than 10 hours of C&W attack–a more
than 500-fold speedup. The ability to generate a large num-
ber of adversarial images in a such a small time makes our
attack method practical in real-time applications.
High Transferability CAG always has ASR greater than
95% in white-box attack scenario. However, considering
black-box attack, when attackers have no access to archi-
tecture and parameters of the classifier, ASR is not as high
as the white-box scenario. To address this high transferbility
requirement, we propose to drop out part of the perturbation
before adding it on the benign image during training phase.
As a result, CAG generalizes better and is less prone to over-
fitting to a particular classifier. Hence, the transferability of
the adversarial examples to new classifiers increases. We
train 4 CAG models using ResNet-18 with dropout proba-
bility p = 0.0, p = 0.1, p = 0.2 and p = 0.3. The ASR
for 10,000 validation images (only 1000 images for C&W)
targeted on random incorrect classes are reported. Table 2
reveals that even without dropout, CAG still has better per-
formance in black-box results compared with other methods.
Furthermore, the transferability of adversarial examples im-
proves with increasing dropout probability.
5.3 ImageNet
We also evaluate the CAG on ImageNet. In our experiments,
CAG takes a long time to converge when trained with a
single classifier. Thus to accelerate the training process and
perform stronger attack, we train CAG with an ensemble of
ResNet-18, VGG-11 and DenseNet-121. When training with
an ensemble of classifiers, we observe that the CAG does not
suffer from over-fitting as much as training with only one
classifier. Hence, unlike the best configuration in CIFAR-
10 where p = 0.3, we reduce the perturbation dropout to
p = 0.1 in this case.
To explicitly demonstrate the performance of our pro-
posed method, we compare our results with GAP (Poursaeed
et al. 2018). To create a fair comparison, we implement GAP
with two architectures and keep the configuration the same
as our method. The first GAP uses identical generative ar-
chitecture to ours, so we denote it GAP U-Net. The second
GAP has the same architecture used in GAP’s original paper,
which we denote it GAP ResNet. However, to perform tar-
geted attack, GAP requires 1 model for each targeted class.
Because we do not have enough resources to train 1,000
GAP models to have a comprehensive evaluation, we train 5
models for each architecture targeted at these following ran-
dom chosen classes: black swan, Tibetan terrier, tiger beetle,
cliff dwelling, hook.
Low Memory Cost The comparison result is shown in Ta-
ble 3. 10,000 benign images are randomly picked from the
validation dataset to do the evaluation. We use CAG to gen-
erate adversarial examples targeted at the same 5 selected
labels for fair comparison. In addition, since our proposed
CAG can perform the comprehensive targeted attack on all
1,000 classes, we also generate adversarial images crossing
all classes. In the table, 5T means ASR are evaluated on a
pool of the same 5 targeted classes using 10,000 images in
ImageNet evaluation dataset. In the last row, 1000T means
that 10,000 images are targeted to any randomly selected
label from all 1,000 classes. As can be seen from the ta-
ble, to perform comprehensive attacks to all 1000 classes of
ImageNet, our model takes 222MB of storage: 30MB for
model’s weights, and 192MB for the embeddings. However,
other generative models can take up to 30MB × 1000 ≈
30GB for storage to attack all classes. Moreover, as shown
in Table 3, for seen classifiers, ASR is above 90% for all
approaches. On the one hand, while targeting 5 selected
classes, adversarial images generated by GAP U-Net and
CAG have comparable performance. On the other hand, by
analyzing the result of unseen classifiers, we can see that
CAG outperforms GAP. ASR of CAG can reach to 93.42%
for 1,000 target labels in black-box scenario. To sum up, our
proposed CAG is more practical to perform general targeted
attack while keeping high ASR and transferability.
5.4 Breaking Defenses
Enhanced Robustness Finally, we study the robustness of
adversarial examples generated by CAG on ImageNet. We
prepare CAG trained on the ensemble of ResNet-18, VGG-
11 and DenseNet-121. Using the optimal setting, the dropout
probability is set to 0.1. Since it is meaningless to protect
Attacks / Classifiers RN-34 VGG-11 VGG-13 DN-121 DN-169 Average
I-FGSM 30.45% 21.39% 23.88% 29.01% 28.70% 26.69%
PGD 45.38% 28.46% 34.90% 41.15% 40.05% 37.99%
C&W 7.57% 8.88% 8.40% 6.61% 7.70% 7.85%
CAG p = 0.0 86.47% 66.46% 94.09% 83.64% 85.74% 83.78%
CAG p = 0.1 89.02% 70.51% 95.10% 87.01% 88.52% 85.92%
CAG p = 0.2 90.83% 74.31% 94.93% 88.93% 90.37% 87.85%
CAG p = 0.3 91.83% 77.81% 94.89% 90.49% 91.31% 89.24%
Table 2: Comparison of transferbility (ASR) of various attack methods and CAG with different dropout rate p on ResNet-18 in
black-box scenario (CIFAR-10).
Storage White-box Black-box
Attacks / Classifiers RN-18 VGG-11 DN-121 Average RN-34 VGG-13 DN-169 Average
GAP Unet (5T) 30 MB × 5 97.98% 98.45% 97.85% 98.09% 82.97% 85.69% 88.31% 85.66%
GAP ResNet (5T) 30 MB × 5 91.02% 94.25% 90.58% 91.95% 76.40% 86.27% 78.33% 80.33%
GAP (1000T) 30 MB × 1000 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
CAG (5T) 222 MB 98.52% 97.71% 96.91% 97.71% 95.45% 94.34% 94.06% 94.62%
CAG (1000T) 222 MB 97.79% 97.01% 96.62% 97.14% 93.38% 94.28% 92.61% 93.42%
Table 3: Storage and ASR comparison of adversarial examples generated by CAG and GAP (ImageNet). Both are trained on
ensemble of models: RN-18, VGG-11 and DN-121. 5T and 1000T represents 5 and 1000 targeted classes, respectively. Due to
the limitation of storage and impractical training time, we can not report the attack results on GAP with 1000T.
White-box Black-box
Defense Methods RN-18 VGG-11 DN-121 Average AverageI-FGSM RN-34 VGG-13 DN-169 Average
Average
I-FGSM
None 0.59% 1.03% 1.50% 1.04% 4.58% 2.10% 1.51% 3.85% 2.49% 42.17%
Pixel Deflection 24.75% 26.39% 31.76% 27.63% 14.76% 33.83% 23.44% 43.45% 33.57% 57.25%
Randomization 3.06% 3.07% 6.80% 4.31% 22.19% 5.26% 2.77% 10.23% 6.09% 43.90%
Bit Depth Reduction 4.80% 7.33% 10.41% 7.51% 10.22% 11.12% 10.18% 17.85% 12.96% 50.08%
JPEG Compression 5.81% 7.63% 11.05% 8.16% 12.62% 12.17% 10.48% 17.78% 13.48% 49.36%
Table 4: Classification accuracy of CAG’s adversarial images versus I-FGSM’s after applying defense mechanisms (ImageNet).
images that are originally mis-classified, we evaluate 10,000
(ImageNet) images that are correctly classified by all three
classifiers. We use the following configurations:
Pixel Deflection To achieve the strongest defense perfor-
mance we provide the CAMs of the true class of correctly
classified images to guide the pixel deflection (unlike using
CAMs of top-5 predictions as the original paper suggests).
We set the parameters following the original paper with win-
dow=10, deflections=100.
Randomization To perform this defense with optimal pa-
rameters, we keep the scale ratio the same as the ratio re-
ported in the original paper. Thus the image size is modified
from 224×224×3 to 253×253×3 in our implementation.
Bit-depth Reduction In our experimental setting, we re-
duce images to 3 bits as the original paper (Xie et al. 2017).
JPEG Compression We perform JPEG compression at
quality level 75 out of 100.
Classification accuracy after applying defense methods is
shown in Table 4. As a result of using CAM guidance in
proposed CAG, our attack is robust against defense meth-
ods that aim to modify the non-discriminative regions such
as pixel deflection and randomization. After using pixel de-
flection, classifiers accuracy on CAG’s generated adversar-
ial images is still low at 27.63% (white-box) and 33.34%
(black-box). In addition, CAG’s adversarial images can by-
pass the defense effects of input transformation. Bit depth
reduction and JPEG compression can not improve the accu-
racy more than 10% for white-box and 14% for black-box
setting. Compared with I-FGSM, our attack achieves lower
classification accuracy in almost all categories. To sum up,
our attack is robust against many defense mechanisms.
6 Conclusions
In this work, we propose a generative model to perform tar-
geted adversarial attacks called CAG. With the help of the
trainable embedding layer, the supervision of CAMs and
random dropout, CAG is able to produce robust adversarial
examples with state-of-art attacking performance and high
transferability, while still maintaining low computation time
and low memory cost. CAG has many desirable properties
of an adversarial attack method, and therefore outperforms
many other methods and can launch a real-time robust attack
against many modern DNN systems.
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